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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
• "Tf OF UTAH, 
Pl aintiff-Peti ti oner, 
JAMES D. CHAMBERS, STANLEY NED 
JACOBSEN, and J.D. (last name 
unknown), 
Defendants-Respondents.: 
Case No. 19151 
Case No. 19152 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing 
is whether the Court incorrectly concluded that "the statutory 
language [of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-402 (1) (1978) J should not be 
used in any form in instructing juries in criminal cases." ~ 
v. Chambers, Utah, __ P.2d __ , Nos. 19151 and 19152, slip op. at 
9 (filed October 21, 1985) (emphasis added) (a copy of the entire 
opinion is contained in the Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants, James D. Chambers and Stanley Ned Jacobsen, 
were charged with burglary, a second degree felony, under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1978), and theft, a second degree felony, 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (1978). After a jury trial, both 
defendants were found guilty as charged. Each was sentenced to 
the Utah State Prison for a term of one to fifteen years for 
1,, lylary and for a tern of one to fifteen years for theft, the 
rii_r_r1'-·1--::...i tn run consecutively. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
The State agrees with the fact statement set forth in 
the Court's opinion in~~~ Chambers, slip op. at 1-2. 
SUMMARY fil ARGUMENT 
In stating that the language of§ 76-6-402(1) should 
not be used "in any form" in instructing juries, the Court 
appears to have concluded that a permissive inference 
instruction, which is not merely a verbatim recitation of the 
statutory language but which uses a "form" of that language, is 
improper. Such a conclusion is contrary to established law. 
If the State is misinterpreting the Court's statement, 
and the Court did not intend to prohibit a permissive inference 
instruction regarding unexplained or unsatisfactorily explained 
possession of recently stolen property, perhaps the Court's 
opinion could be modified so as to clarify this point. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Brown y. Pickard, den~ing reh'g, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 
512 (1886), this Court set forth the standard for determining 
whether a petition for rehearing should be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 <citation omitted). In Cummings y. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Court stated: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
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all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result 
. • • • If there are some reasons, however, 
such as we have indicated above, or other 
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing 
should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this 
brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the 
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and 
should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT "THE STATUTORY 
LANGUAGE [OF § 76-6-402(1)) SHOULD NOT BE 
USED IN ANY FORM IN INSTRUCTING JURIES IN 
CRIMINAL CASES" APPEARS TO BE CONTRARY TO 
ESTABLISHED LAW. 
After fully analyzing the United States Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Francis v. Franklin, ~- U.S. ~-' 105 s. Ct. 
1965 (1985), the Court in Chambers reached the inescapable 
conclusion that certain jury instructions that were given were 
unconstitutional because they either created a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption in violation of Franklin or could 
ieasonably have been understood to relieve the State of its 
•Jpn of proof in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S . 
• r: 11979). Chambers, slip op. at 4-7. However, the Court 
further concluded that "the statutory language [of UTAH CODE ANN. 
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§ 76-6-402(1) (1978)] should not be used in any form in 
instructing juries in criminal cases." .l.d. at 9 (emphasis 
added). This conclusion appears to be contrary to established 
law. 
By stating that the language of§ 76-6-402(1)1 should 
not be used "in any form" in jury instructions, the Court appears 
to have decided that the following instruction, for example, even 
though embodying a permissive inference, rather than a mandatory 
or mandatory rebuttable presumption, would be unconstitutional: 
You are further instructed that one who 
is found to be in possession of property 
recently stolen, may be found to be the 
guilty person unless he gives a satisfactory 
explanation of his possession thereof.2 
That this is what the Court actually concluded is further 
supported by its application of Chambers in a companion case, 
State y. Pacheco, Utah, __ P.2d __ ,No. 20047 (filed October 
21, 1985) ,3 where the Court makes quite clear that the "inference 
set out in section 76-6-402(1)" is not one for jury 
consideration, but is only applicable to the court's 
determination of whether a "prima facie" case has been 
1 Section 76-6-402(1), which is simply a codification of a 
"traditional corrunon-law inference deeply rooted in our law," 
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973), reads: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when 
no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property. 
2 This particular instruction was upheld in State v. Asay, 631 
P.2d 861 (Utah 1981). 
3 The State is also petitioning for rehearing in Pacheco. 
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established. Pacheco, slip op. at 3-4. The Court apparently 
believed that Franklin and Sandstrom dictated such a conclusion. 
nowever, this is not consistent with Franklin, Sandstrom, or 
1 iled Supreme Court decisions. ~Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 519 
1'. q_ Nor is it consistent with Barnes y. United States, 412 
11.s. 837 (1973), which expressly held that a jury instruction 
permitting the inference of guilty knowledge from unexplained 
possession of recently stolen property, whether given pursuant to 
a statute or based upon the common-law inference, satisfies the 
requirements of due process and does not violate a defendant's 
privilege against self-incrimination. 412 U.S. at 846-47 • .c.t. 
State y. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45-6 (Utah 1978); State y. 
Kirkham, 20 Utah 2d 44, 432 P.2d 638 ( 1967) (cases implicitly 
recognizing the validity of this common-law inference in the 
context of approving its use in burglary cases). The inference 
regarding possession of recently stolen property, which is often 
critical to the government's case, is widely accepted in both 
federal and state courts. See generally, Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 
1178 (1978 and Supp. 1985). Thus, it appears the Court either 
overlooked or misapprehended significant case law in determining 
that the statutory language of § 76-6-40 2 (1) should not be used 
in "any form" in jury instructions.4 
4 It is somewhat confusing that the Court in Chambers seemingly 
did not disapprove of the jury instruction upheld in State y. 
~(quoted above). Chambers, slip op. at 7. Despite the 
Court's observation to the contrary, the~ instruction clearly 
fll',!Jloyed the language of § 76-6-402 (1) . .s.e& AsiJ.:;t, 631 P.2d at 
Hf'J Although the words "shall be deemed prima facie evidence" 
''"' e not used, a "form" of the language contained in § 76-6-
411111) obviously was used in the instruction. 
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If the State is misinterpreting the Court's statement 
that "the statutory language should not be used in any form," 
perhaps the Chambers opinion could be clarified. It may be that 
the Court did not intend for that language to be read so as to 
preclude the giving of an instruction similar to that given in 
~--i.e., an instruction that is not merely a verbatim 
recitation of § 76-6-402(1), but one that avoids the use of the 
term "prima facie" (or defines that term appropriately) and sets 
out an inference that ~ be drawn by the jury from the 
unexplained or unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently 
stolen property. If this is so, the current language probably 
should be modified in order to make that point clear. Such a 
clarification would, of course, cure the apparent inconsistency 
of the Court's statement with United States Supreme Court case 
law holding that this inference regarding possession of recently 
stolen property is constitutionally valid. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it appears that 
the Court in State y. Chambers either overlooked or 
misapprehended significant case law in concluding that the 
language of § 76-6-402(1) should not be used "in any form" in 
instructing juries in criminal cases. Therefore, the State's 
petition for rehearing should be granted and the case should be 
restored to the calendar for reargument or resubmission. ~ 
Utah R. App. P. 35(c) (1985). 
Alternatively, if the State is misinterpreting the 
Court's opinion in this regard, perhaps the opinion can be 
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n1odif ied so as to make clear that a permissive inference 
instruction like that upheld in ~ is still viable under 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
faith and not for purposes of delay. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ~f November, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
cffi~J]~ 
DAVID B. THOMPSON  
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
a 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----00000-----
state of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
James D. Chambers, Stanley Ned 
Jacobsen, and J.D. (last name 
unknown), 
Defendants and Appellant. 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
James D. Chambers, Stanley Ned 
Jacobsen, and J. D. (last name 
unknown), 
Defendants and Appellant. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
No. 19151 
No. 19152 
F I L E D 
October 21, 1985 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Defendants James Chambers and Stanley Jacobsen appeal 
from a conviction of burglary, a second degree "felony under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-202, and theft, a second degree felony 
under U.C.A., 1953, ~ 76-6-404. We reverse the convictions and 
remand for a new trial. 
On January 6, 1983, an informant contacted officers of 
the Park City Police Department and told them that a burglary 
had taken place in the vicinity of Park City. The informant 
stated that he knew who had committed the crime. Police 
officers met with the informant, who offered to take the 
officers to the residence where the stolen items were being 
held. At that meeting, the informant said that some of the 
items involved in the burglary were stereos with speakers, 
video cassettes, televisions, and clothing. The informant then 
took the officers to the residence of James Chambers. The 
informant also arranged a meeting between defendants and a Park 
City Police officer operating under cover; the purpose of the 
meeting was to have the undercover officer make a "buy" of some 
of the stolen property from defendants. On January 7, the 
officer, the informant, and defendants met at the informant's 
apartment. After some conversation in which defendants 
e•pressed concern about the possible presence of police in the 
are~, defendants took the officer outside to a car and showed 
l1m a video cassette recorder which the officer bought for $200. 
_____,,._. 
Also on January 7, a burglary was reported by a Summit 
Park resident, Richard Thompson. Mr. Thompson had returned hone 
that day after a business trip and discovered that his home had 
been burglarized. He reported missing a Sony video cassette 
recorder, a cassette deck, stereo equipment, a pistol, a leather 
coat, and a pair of Tony Lama cowboy boots. Mr. Thompson later 
identified the video cassette recorder purchased from defendants 
as the one missing from his home. 
On January 10, 1983, an officer of the Park City Pol1r·,_ 
Department obtained a search warrant for defendant Chambers' 
residence. Defendant Jacobsen was also living in the residencE 
at the time. Pursuant to the warrant, officers searched the 
home and seized one pair of Tony Lama boots and a .22 caliber 
pistol. At trial, Mr. Thompson identified the pistol and the 
boots as those stolen from his home. 
Prior to trial, defendants filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. They also 
filed a motion to require the State to disclose the identity of 
the confidential informant. Both motions were argued before the 
trial court and were subsequently denied. 
At trial, defendants presented testimony which sought 
to establish their whereabouts at the time of the crime. Defen-
dants also presented evidence in explanation of their possession 
of the video cassette recorder, the pistol, and the cowboy boots. 
On appeal defendants raise five issues: invalidity of 
the search warrant, denial of due process by the court's failure 
to require the State to disclose the identity of the confidential 
informant, two constitutional errors in connection with jury 
instructions, and insufficiency of the evidence. 
Defendants' first argument is that the trial court 
erred by not suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the 
search warrant; defendants claim that the underlying affidavit 
was not sufficient based on the two-pronged test established in 
Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and followed in 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Defendants 
concede that under the "totality of the circumstances" test 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the affidavit would have been 
sufficient. However, defendants contend that the Gates test is 
not the appropriate test to be applied in this case, because the 
Gates test was prospective only. In particular, defendants rely 
on the following language: 
For all of these reasons, we conclude 
that it is wiser to abandon the "two-pronged 
test" established by our decisions in Aguilar 
and Spinelli. In its place, we reaffirm the 
totality of the circumstances analysis that 
traditionally has formed probable cause 
determinations. 
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462 U.S. at 238 (footnote and citations omitted). It is this 
very language, however, that indicates that the totality of the 
circumstances test is the traditional analysis and that the two-
pronged test was a supplementary standard which was superimposed 
on the traditional test. By •reaffirming• the traditional 
analysis, in effect, Gates stripped away certain refinements 
and retained the simpler totality of the circumstances test, 
thereby returning probable cause analysis to its traditional 
basis. Further, in Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. ct. 2085 
11984), the Supreme Court retroactively applied the Gates test 
to determine the validity of a search warrant issued~ 
September 1980, almost three years prior to the announcement of 
the Gates decision. We find, therefore, that the application 
of the totality of the circumstances test was proper here. 
Defendants next contend that they were denied due 
process of law because the trial court failed to require the 
state to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. 
Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which was applicable at 
the time of trial, provides: 
A witness has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose the identity of a person who has 
furnished information purporting to disclose 
a violation of a provision of the laws of 
this state or of the United States to a rep-
resentative of the state or the United States 
or governmental division thereof, charged 
with the duty of enforcing that provision, 
and evidence thereof is inadmissible, unless 
the judge finds that (a) the identity.of the 
person furnishing the information has already 
been otherwise disclosed or (b) disclosure 
of his identity is essential to assure a 
fair determination of the issues. 
Utah R. Evid., Vol. 9B, U.C.A., 1953 (1977). 
In State v. Forshee, Utah, 611 P.2d 1222 (1980), we 
said, •There are two exceptions to the general privilege of 
nondisclosure of an informer's identity. Disclosure is re-
quired (1) when the informer's identity is already known, and 
(2) when disclosure is essential 'to assure a fair determination 
of the issues. 1 • Id. at 1224 (citing from Rule 36, Utah R. 
Evid.). Because it was evident that the defendant in that 
case knew the identity of the informant, we further said: 
However, it is defendant's very knowledge of 
the informer's identity that further served 
to vitiate any prejudice that may have other-
wise resulted from the lower court's failure 
to require disclosure. Thus, the court's 
failure to l·equire disclosure of the in-
former's identity, in any event, is at best 
harmless error. 
3 Nos. 19151 and 19152 
Id. at 1225 (citation omitted). From our review of the record 
it is equally evident that defendants in this case were aware 
of the identity of the confidential informant. 1 Therefore, we 
conclude that Forshee is dispositive and that defendants' clair 
is without merit. 
Defendants raise two issues concerning the jury 
instructions that were given at trial. Defendants' claims 
focus on jury instruction No. 18 which contained the following 
A person commits theft if he obtains 
or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with the purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
Possession of property recently stolen, 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property. 
This instruction is in part based on U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-402(1). 
Defendants first contend that instruction No. 18 improperly com-
ments upon a defendant's failure to testify and that it penalizes 
the accused for exercising the constitutional right to remain 
silent. On that basis, defendants argue that the jury instruc-
tion was improper and that the underlying statute is unconstitu-
tional. Defendants' second claim is that the instruction shifts 
the burden of proof to defendants and is therefore inconsistent 
with defendants' rights to be presumed innocent. 
Defendants' first argument, that the instruction 
infringes on federal Fifth Alllend.JDent rights, is not persuasive. 
Nothing in the instruction required testimony by defendants, 
because an explanation of possession could have been made by the 
testimony of other witnesses or by other evidence. In a similar 
situation, the United States Supreme Court found this argument 
to be without merit: "Petitioner also argues that the permissive 
inference in question infringes his privilege against self-
incrimination. The Court has twice rejected this argument." 
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 (1973) .2 Therefore, 
1. The testimony of the officers about this circumstance of 
their introduction to the defendants, and the events in which 
the informant participated, make it clear that the informant was 
known to the defendants, and readily identifiable by them once 
his part in the proceedings was disclosed. 
2. In Barnes, the disputed instruction included a statement 
that the petitioner had a right not to take the witness stand 
and also that evidence other than defendant's testimony could 
explain possession. In the instant case, the jury was only in-
structed on defendants' privilege to not testify. There was, 
however, testimony by defendant Chambers' wife which attempted 
to explain possession of some of the items involved in this case 
Thus, the possibility of explanation provided by evidence other 
than defendants' testimony should have been obvious to the jury. 
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we conclude that defendants' argument on this point is not com-
pelling. See also Annot., 88 A.L.R. 3d 1178 (1978) (indicating 
the trend established in recent cases that instructions such as 
the one in question do not constitute an improper col!lltlent by the 
court on the defendant's failure to testify, and do not violate 
the privilege against self-incrimination). 
Defendants' second claim regarding the jury instruc-
' , ons is more problematic. Defendants argue that instruction 
1Jc_,_ 18 violates their rights to a presumption of innocence and 
Jmproperly shifts the burden of proving innocence to defendants. 
Instruction No. 18 refers to a statutory presumption which links 
the basic fact of possession of recently stolen property, in the 
absence of a satisfactory explanation of possession, to the 
ultimate fact or conclusion that the person in possession stole 
the property. The presumption does not mandate a finding of 
guilt; it merely provides that proof of the basic fact is 
sufficient to serve as prima facie evidence of the ultimate 
fact. Inferences and presumptions are common factfinding 
devices whereby one fact is used to determine the existence of 
another fact. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 
140, 156 (1979); State v. Robichaux, Utah, 639 P.2d 207, 208 
(1981). •[I)n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any [evi-
dentiary) device's constitutional validity in a given case 
remains constant: the device must not undermine the fact-
f inder' s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by 
the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt.• Allen, 442 U.S. at 156 (citations omitted). In their 
argument, defendants rely on State v. Walton, Utah, 646 P.2d 
689 (1982), where this Court found reversible error based on an 
instruction which read, *[T)he law presumes that a person 
intends the reasonable and ordinary consequences of his own 
acts.• In Walton, we followed Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 
510 (1979), which held that an identical instruction violated 
due process. In Sandstrom, the Supreme Court reasoned that the 
jury could have interpreted the presumption as irrebuttable or 
alternatively as requiring a high level of proof in order to 
rebut the presumption, thereby •effectively shifting the burden 
of persuasion .... • Id. at 517. The standard established 
in Sandstrom is •whether~he challenged jury instruction had 
the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof 
enunciated in [In re) Winship (397 U.S. 358 (1970)) .... • 
Id. at 521. As the Court noted in Sandstrom, Id. at 520, In re 
Winship held that the due process clause requires •proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime . . charged.• 397 U.S. at 364. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently once 
again addressed the constitutionality of presumptions used in 
jury instructions. In Francis v. Franklin, 105 S. Ct. 1965 
(1985), the Court dealt with an instruction quite similar to 
that held unconstitutiunal in Sandstrom. Using the same 
•threshold inquiry• as to the nature of the presumption as 
~as used in Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514, the Franklin Court 
established that~instruction included a mandatory 
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presumption, i.e., a presumption which "instructs the jury that 
it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain 
predicate facts." 105 s. Ct. at 1971. The Court then applied 
the Sandstrom standard of relief of burden of proof on an 
element of the crime charged. Id. On the basis of that 
analysis, however, Franklin extended the Sandstrom decision an~ 
found that use of any mandatory rebuttable presumption in a 
jury instruction is unconstitutional. 
A mandatory rebuttable presumption . . . 
relieves the state of the affirmative burden 
of persuasion on the presumed element by 
instructing the jury that it must find the 
presumed element unless the defendant 
persuades the jury not to make such a 
finding. A mandatory rebuttable pre-
sumption is perhaps less onerous [than an 
irrebuttable or conclusive presumption) from 
the defendant's perspective, but it is no 
less unconstitutional. 
Id. at 1972-73. 
The instruction given in this case is different from 
the instructions found to be unconstitutional in Sandstrom and 
Franklin. In this case the trial court instructed the jury 
that possession of recently stolen property, in the absence of 
a satisfactory explanation, is "prima facie" evidence of theft 
by the person in possession of the property. Such an instruc-
tion, nevertheless, fits within the Franklin definition of a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption: "A [mandatory] rebuttable 
presumption . . . requires the jury to find the element unless 
the defendant persuades the jury that such a finding is un-
warranted." 105 S. Ct. at 1971, n. 2. 
We therefore hold that the instruction given in this 
case was unconstitutional. Further, although there was another 
instruction given, instruction No. 25, which restated the 
presumption in permissive form, the additional instruction 
failed to cure the defect. "Language that merely contradicts 
and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will 
not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A reviewing court has no 
way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the 
jurors applied in reaching their verdict." 105 S. ct. at 1975 
(footnote omitted). Thus, because the mandatory presumption in 
question directly related to the determination of defendants' 
guilt, we hold that defendants are entitled to a new trial. 
In reaching this decision, we~further note that 
instruction No. 18 was accompanied by another instruction whicr. 
defined "prima facie." Instruction No. 19 read as follows: 
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The term •Prima Facie• as used herein 
means, at first sight; on the first appear-
ance; on the face of it; so far as can be 
judged from the first disclosure; pre-
sumably; a fact presumed to be true unless 
disproved by some evidence to the contrary. 
,rmphasis added.) The use of the word •disproved• could well 
1,ave indicated to a juror that the defendants were required to 
rl1sprove guilt. An instruction which could reasonably be 
understood to relieve the State of its burden of proof is 
constitutionally defective. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 510, 524. 
Thus, the use of this instruction would itself have required 
reversal based on principles dictated by Sandstrom and without 
reference to the stricter application prescribed by Franklin. 
Finally, we address the continued viability of the 
language of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-402(1). Although a jury 
instruction which uses the statutory language verbatim is, as 
we have stated, unconstitutional, we find no similar infirmity 
in the statute itself as the statute, properly construed, is 
directed to the court. In State v. Asay, Utah, 631 P.2d 861 
(1981), this court construed the function of section 76-6-402(1) 
and upheld an instruction which, unlike the instant case, did 
not use the statutory language. The Court pointed out that the 
statute does not affect the jury's weighing of the evidence; 
rather, the statute provides a standard by which to determine 
the sufficiency of the evidence for submitting the case to the 
jury. The statute may properly be used to defeat a claim by a 
defendant that the State has, as a matter of law, failed to 
establish a prima facie case against the defendant. Id. at 
864; State v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d 149, 151, 449 P.2d---g93, 
994-95 (1969). This construction of the statute is consistent 
with our early decisions which found that giving an instruction 
using the term prima facie was improper, although not preju-
dicial where the court further instructed the jury that the 
State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Crowder, 114 Utah 202, 210, 197 P.2d 917, 921-22 (1948); State 
v. Hall, 105 Utah 162, 175-76, 145 P.2d 494, 500 (1944). ~
State v. Crowder, the court said, •what constitutes a prima 
facie case is one for the court to determine and the jury does 
not pass on nor is it concerned at all with that question. 
This statute is addressed only to the court .... " 
114 Utah at 209-10, 197 P.2d at 921, (referring to U.C.A., 
1943, § 103-36-l, unsatisfactory explanation of recently stolen 
property is prima facie evidence of guilt). Similarly, in 
State v. Hall, 105 Utah at 175, 197 P.2d at 500, the Court 
noted: 
The jury is not concerned with a 
determinati0n of when the State has made 
out a prima facie case; its duty is to 
determine the issue of ultimate guilt. 
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An instruction . . . which concerns 
the evidence necessary to make out a prima 
facie case for the State would only be 
confusing and might lead the jury to 
conclude the State had met its burden of 
proving ultimate guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt by making out a prima facie case. 
(Citations omitted.) The Court then concluded that the prima 
facie instruction was improper but not prejudicial in light of 
other instructions regarding the State's burden of proof. 
In State v. Baretta, 47 Utah 479, 155 P. 343 (1916), 
the Court indicated that only in cases where the burden of 
proof shifts may juries properly be concerned with questions of 
what constitutes a prima facie case (i.e., civil cases). In 
criminal cases, however, where the burden remains on the State 
throughout the case, the jury should not be involved in such 
considerations. 
Undoubtedly, the court has to do with ques-
tions of a prima facie case whenever it 
withholds from, or submits a case to, the 
jury. But that determination ... is one 
of law and not of fact .... So, when a 
case as this is submitted to a jury, they 
have nothing to do with questions of what is 
or what is not, a prima facie case .... 
They, to convict, are required to find an 
accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
.... We think a charge, that recent pos-
session of stolen property when the party in 
possession failed to make a satisfactory ex-
planation was prima facie evidence of guilt, 
may do harm by singling out and emphasizing 
particular evidence in a cause to the exclu-
sion of other evidence which may be of equal 
or greater importance, and, without further 
explanation or direction, may tend to convey 
a meaning to the jury that when such enumer-
ated particulars are shown the burden of 
proof is shifted to the accused, which, if 
not sustained by him, requires the verdict 
to be cast against him . . . . So we do not 
see what the question of a prima facie case 
has to do with the jury and think the charge 
ought not to have been given. 
~ 
47 Utah at 489-90, 155 P.2d at 346-47. (Citations omitted). 
We therefore conclude that a jury instruction using th,: 
language of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-402(1) is unconstitutional be-
cause it directly relates to the issue of guilt and relieves tr, 
State of its burden of proof. The statute itself, however, is 
addressed to the court and merely provides a standard by which 
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to determine whether the evidence presented warrants submission 
to the jury. Thus, the statutory language should not be used 
in any form in instructing juries in criminal cases, and we 
expressly disavow the language and holdings of our earlier 
cases to the contrary. 
on that basis, the statute is not constitutionally defective. 
Defendants also claim that the evidence in this case 
, ac insufficient to support their convictions. Because we are 
,pmanding for a new trial, we do not treat this issue. 
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case is 
remanded for a new trial. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Michael D. Zillllllerman, Justice 
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